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PREEMPTION, COMMANDEERING, AND THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER* &
RANDALL F. KHALIL**
This year (2022), the Supreme Court agreed to review wide-ranging
constitutional challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) brought by
the State of Texas and three non-Indian foster families in the October 2022
Term. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that certain provisions of ICWA
violated the anti-commandeering principle implied in the Tenth Amendment
and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
We argue that the anti-commandeering challenges against ICWA are
unfounded because all provisions of ICWA provide a set of legal standards
to be applied in states which validly and expressly preempt state law without
unlawfully commandeering the states’ executive or legislative branches.
Congress’s power to compel state courts to apply federal law is long
established and beyond question.
Yet even if some ICWA provisions violated the Tenth Amendment, we
argue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment sufficiently authorizes
Congress’s enactment of ICWA so as to defeat the anti-commandeering
concerns. Strangely, no party ever invoked Congress’s power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to assess its constitutionality. ICWA seems
like an obvious candidate for analysis under Congress’s Section 5
enforcement powers. States routinely discriminate against American Indian
families on the basis of their race and ancestry (and their religion and culture),
and ICWA is designed to remedy the abuses of state courts and agencies.
We further have no doubt that the state legislatures that adopted ICWA
in whole, in part, or as modified also possessed the power to do so, even in
the event the Supreme Court holds all or portions of ICWA unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
In the language of the Anishinaabe nations, the words for baby or
young child are binoojiinh (Ojibwe and Odawa) and penojé
(Bodewadmi), which means literally “a young spirit coming forth.”1 For
Anishinaabe people, children are supernatural creatures. They come into
the world with powers of observation and learning far exceeding that of
grown people.2 They are treated with deference and respect. Anishinaabe
people take their obligations to children seriously. Anishinaabe children
“learn about governance, power, decision making and our political
cultures” through their place in family.3 Anishinaabe people privilege
connectivity over individuality, harmony over control, and deference to
Anishinaabewaki, the world around us. Aabawaadiziwin means
“togetherness,” a manifestation of the political philosophies rooted in
Anishinaabe culture.4 Anishinaabe people hope to teach their children to
“[m]aintain[] balance and harmony through good relationships.”5
In contrast, American political philosophy is rooted in dominion,
hierarchy, and power.6 Life is compartmentalized, not interconnected.
“At common law, children were treated as chattel.”7 First year law
students learn in Torts that American courts valued children primarily by
1.
Putting Our Minds Together for Our Children, THE PUNDIT (Dec. 20,
2017), https://michildsupportpundit.blogspot.com/2017/12/putting-our-minds-togetherfor-our.html [https://perma.cc/LJ6P-TTFF] (quoting Michael D. Petoskey, Chief Judge
of the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and the Match-E-Be-Bash-She-Wish Band
of Pottawatomi Indians); see also Binoojiinh, NISHNAABEMWIN WEB DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.nishnaabemwin.atlas-ling.ca/#/entry/n72977545112n
[https://perma.cc/M57A-6HXB] (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
2.
LEANNE BETASAMOSAKE SIMPSON, DANCING ON OUR TURTLE’S BACK:
STORIES OF NISHNAABEG RE-CREATION, RESURGENCE AND A NEW EMERGENCE 123 (2011).
3.
Id. at 122.
4.
Id.
5.
Susan Chiblow (Ogamauh annag qwe), Anishinabek Women’s Nibi
Giikendaaswin (Water Knowledge), 11 WATER 206, 214 (2019).
6.
See generally C. Wright Mills, The Structure of Power in American
Society, 9 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 29 (1958) (describing how education, religion, and family are
shaped by political, military, and economic institutions).
7.
Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children as Property: The Transitive
Family, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 237 (2010).
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the economic value of their labor; if children were lost, the cost could
quickly be offset by the production of another child.8 Because the law
presumed children’s economic value declined as children stopped
entering the workforce in great numbers, it makes sense that state
governments did virtually nothing to establish governmental service
programs for children in need at the Founding until well into the 20th
century.9 Because child welfare services are expensive and, again,
children generate little economic value as a matter of law, it makes
further sense that child protective services that states eventually
established were poorly designed and funded.10 And because these
services are directed toward underprivileged persons, it was all too easy
for states to weaponize those services against poor people and people of
color.11 If child welfare systems are microcosms of the government
American children learn, then American children learn a very specific
form of brutal government.
As any observer of American history realizes, the American
government (and its colonial predecessors) focused policies of dominion,
hierarchy, and power on Native families for centuries. A government
rooted in dominion, hierarchy, and power still uses exactly those tools to
remedy these harms. Only in the last half century or so has the United
States government begun to take small steps to acknowledge and repair
the intergenerational harms these policies caused.12 One of Congress’s
key tools for this is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
American Indian affairs and the Fourteenth Amendment have a
strange, undertheorized relationship. It is well established that Congress
possesses plenary power in Indian affairs by virtue of several
Constitutional provisions, the structure of the Constitution, and treaties
made with Indian tribes.13 The Supreme Court has pointed to the
Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, the Property and Territory Clause,
and even the preconstitutional powers of the United States as sources of

8.
Jill Wieber Lens, Children, Wrongful Death, and Punitive Damages, 100
B.U. L. REV. 437, 461 (2020).
9.
See John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42
FAM. L.Q. 449, 452 (2008) (“[I]n the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, child
protection agencies were nongovernmental.”).
10.
See generally Dorothy Roberts, Five Myths About the Child Welfare
System,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
15,
2022,
1:14
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/04/15/five-myths-child-welfare
[https://perma.cc/TD9N-BKWW] (describing structural problems with state child
welfare systems).
11.
See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Protection as Surveillance of African
American Families, 36 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 426, 426 (2014).
12.
See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
13.
RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 (AM. L. INST. 2022)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT L. AM. INDIANS].

1202

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

this power.14 The Court has also held that the relationship between Indian
tribes and the United States, known since the Founding as the “duty of
protection,” is also a source of Congressional power.15 Virtually all of
federal Indian law—acts of Congress, executive orders, federal
regulations, and Indian treaties—derive from these sources of authority.
What is almost always missing from listings of sources of
Congressional power is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—the
enforcement power. Remedial civil rights statutes constitute a healthy
proportion of Congressional enactments in Indian affairs . Most
obviously, there is the Indian Civil Rights Act, which requires tribal
governments to guarantee certain civil rights to persons under tribal
jurisdiction.16 There is a law extending American citizenship to all
American Indians.17 There is a law authorizing the Interior Secretary to
acquire land in trust to restore lost tribal lands.18 There is also a law
authorizing tribal courts to issue personal protection orders and
obligating state courts to give full faith and credit to those orders.19
Occasionally, federal courts are asked to assess the constitutionality of
these statutes. The challenges almost always involve the scope of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause or the Treaty Clause,20 but
we are aware of no challenge in which a party invoked Section 5.
One of the most important, most litigated, and most controversial
Indian affairs-related civil rights statutes is the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA).21 ICWA partially strips state courts of jurisdiction over certain
child welfare matters involving Indian children and imposes obligations
on state governments as a means of remedying decades of horrific civil
rights abuses perpetrated by states throughout the mid-twentieth

14.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–01 (2004).
15.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
581–82 (1832) (“By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the
protection of the United States: they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them
of the right of self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or
compacts.”).
16.
25 U.S.C. § 1302.
17.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
18.
25 U.S.C. § 5108.
19.
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
20.
E.g., County of Charles Mix v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 799 F. Supp.
2d 1027, 1037 (D.S.D. 2011) (rejecting claims under the Commerce Clause that the
federal statute allowing the United States to acquire land in trust for Indians and tribes
was beyond Congress’ authority).
21.
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
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century.22 Nine states have adopted portions of ICWA as state law or
have adopted modified versions of ICWA even more protective of Indian
families than ICWA itself.23
Late in the October Term 2021, the Supreme Court agreed to review
wide-ranging constitutional challenges to ICWA brought by the State of
Texas and three non-Indian foster families in the October Term 2022.24
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that certain provisions within
ICWA violated the anti-commandeering principle implied in the Tenth
Amendment and the equal protection component implied in the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.25 Texas and the foster families also
argued Congress does not possess the power to enact ICWA and that it
violates the non-delegation doctrine.26
This Essay focuses on the anti-commandeering challenges. We
argue that the anti-commandeering challenges against ICWA are
unfounded because all provisions of ICWA validly and expressly preempt
state law. ICWA mostly provides a set of legal standards for state courts
to apply in child status proceedings involving Indian children, and
Congress’s power to compel state courts to apply federal law is long
established and beyond question. ICWA is a valid exercise of
Congressional power. ICWA creates a set of rights under federal law
protecting parents and Indian custodians of Indian children27 and in no
way directly regulates or commands the States.
We have no doubt that Congress’s Indian affairs powers authorize
the enactment of ICWA (a conclusion reached even by the Fifth Circuit).
Yet strangely, no party has ever invoked Congress’s power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to assess its constitutionality. Perhaps
the reason is that Congress itself implicitly claimed to invoke only its

22.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (finding that “an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of
such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions”); see
also § 1901(5) (finding that “the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families”).
23.
Oregon, Oklahoma, Washington, Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, and Louisiana have state ICWA statutes. Nancy Marie Spears, ICWA Experts
Say State Laws Could Protect Native Families, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 16,
2021), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/icwa-experts-say-state-laws-could-protectnative-families [https://perma.cc/4KQ6-3VQK].
24.
Brackeen v. Haaland, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022) (granting certiorari).
25.
Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (per
curiam).
26.
Id. at 290.
27.
See § 1921.
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Indian affairs powers to enact ICWA, not Section 5.28 ICWA seems like
an obvious candidate for analysis under Congress’s Section 5
enforcement powers. States routinely discriminated against American
Indian families based on their race and ancestry (and religion and
culture). Congress designed ICWA to remedy the abuses of state courts
and agencies. We have no doubt that Section 5 provides Congress with
power sufficient to defeat the anti-commandeering concerns. ICWA is
valid federal law which state courts must apply. Finally, we conclude
that states retain the power to comply with ICWA even if it is declared
unconstitutional.
We begin in Part I with a description of the Indian Child Welfare
Act and the attacks on its constitutionality. In Part II, we explain anticommandeering and preemption doctrine and the distinction between
them. In Part III, we argue that ICWA creates individual rights under
federal law and validly preempts contrary state law without violating the
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle. In Part IV, we
provide a short description of the role (or lack thereof) of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Indian affairs and argue that even if portions of ICWA
violate the anti-commandeering principle, they are nonetheless
constitutional because Congress possesses power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact them using a theory of remedial
commandeering.
I. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is the most successful Indian
affairs-related civil rights statute in history.29 ICWA required states to
provide basic procedural protections to Indian parents and forced states
to reform long-standing discriminatory laws and practices.30 ICWA also
helped to normalize child welfare laws at a time when many states failed
to provide basic procedural protections to all families (not just Indian

28.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (finding that
“clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution provides that ‘[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . with Indian tribes’ and,
through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian
affairs”).
29.
See generally Leah Litman & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Necessity of
the
Indian
Child
Welfare
Act,
ATL.
(Jan.
22,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/fifth-circuit-icwa/605167
[https://perma.cc/6BWZ-HSCD] (invalidating the ICWA would undo doctrines that
facilitate a tribe’s ability to self-govern and prosecute individuals who victimize Native
people).
30.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (right to intervene); see also § 1912(a) (notice);
see also § 1912(b) (appointment of counsel).
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families),31 which is why ICWA’s advocates claim that ICWA is the
“gold standard.”32
In this Part, we trace the history of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
First, we explain ICWA’s: (1) important provisions; (2) legislative
history leading to enactment; and (3) impact. Then, we describe the
constitutional challenges brought against ICWA.

A. Statutory Background
At its core, ICWA creates a set of federal rights for Native custodial
parents. ICWA requires states to give notice to Indian parents and
custodians at critical moments after the initiation of child welfare
proceedings in state courts, and grants Indian parents and custodians the
right to intervene in these proceedings along with a right to be appointed
counsel in these proceedings.33 ICWA requires initiating child welfare
proceedings in state court and notifying Indian custodians at least ten days
before a state court may initiate action.34 Indian custodians are entitled to
examine reports on the welfare of their children.35 State courts must make
a finding that the state agencies made “active efforts” to reunify Indian
families.36 State courts may not terminate an Indian custodian’s parental
rights or place an Indian child in foster care placement with a non-Indian
family without the testimony of an “expert witness” qualified in Indian
child-rearing practices.37 State courts may not terminate parental rights
absent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that “continued custody of
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.”38
To prevent states from coercing Indian custodians into “voluntarily”
waiving their parental rights, ICWA also requires state courts to make a
finding on the record in open court that an Indian custodian has consented
to waiving parental rights, and never earlier than ten days after the birth
31.
E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Neoshia R. Roemer, Procedure and Indian
Children, in A GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTEGRATING CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
85, 89–91 (Brooke Coleman, Suzette Malveaux, Portia Pedro & Elizabeth Porter eds.,
2022) (detailing Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, codified in 1985 in response
to ICWA, and a Minnesota bill to extend ICWA-like protections to African-American
families).
32.
Brief of Casey Family Programs & Child Welfare League of America et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Birth Father at 4, Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399).
33.
§ 1912(a) (notice and intervention); § 1912(b) (counsel).
34.
§ 1912(a).
35.
§ 1912(c).
36.
§ 1912(d). Active efforts are defined at 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2021).
37.
§ 1912(e). Qualifications to be an expert witness for this purpose are found
at 25 C.F.R. § 23.122.
38.
§ 1912(f).
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of an Indian child.39 Indian custodians may withdraw consent to foster
care at any time, and to adoption at any time before the entry of a final
decree.40 To address the states’ discrimination against Indian foster
parents on the basis of race, ICWA requires states to give preference to
Indian foster and adoptive parents.41
In enacting ICWA, Congress found widespread civil rights
violations rooted in race discrimination committed by states against
Indian people.42 Congress found that “an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”43 The House report
accompanying the final bill concluded, “[t]he wholesale separation of
Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and
destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”44 The House report
added that non-Indian state workers targeted Indian children for removal
for neglect even where the Indian parents and custodians were understood
in tribal communities as excellent parents.45 State workers judged Indian
families according to non-Indian norms and found neglect where there
was none.46 Even where removal of Indian children from their homes is
necessary, state laws affirmatively discriminated against potential Indian
foster families, leading state agencies to deny qualified and loving Indian
families licensure to serve as foster parents.47 Congress intended ICWA
to remedy these civil rights violations inflicted upon Indian families and
tribal nations.48
While ICWA has forced states to reckon with their discriminatory
practices, the disproportionate removal of Indian children from their
homes remains a serious problem and continues to justify the need for
ICWA. “According to 2018 data, American Indian/Alaska Native
children didn’t even account for 1% of the population, yet they made up
39.
§ 1913(a).
40.
§ 1913(b) (foster care); § 1913(c) (adoption).
41.
§ 1915(a) (adoption); § 1915(b) (foster care).
42.
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9, 27 (1978).
43.
§ 1901(4).
44.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9.
45.
Id. at 10 (“Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they
regarded as excellent care-givers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers.”).
46.
Id. (“In judging the fitness of a particular [Indian] family, many social
workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions that are
wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life and so they frequently discover
neglect or abandonment where none exists.”).
47.
See id. at 11 (“Discriminatory standards have made it virtually impossible
for most Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents, since they are based on
middle-class values.”).
48.
See id. at 19.

2022:1199

Preemption, Commandeering, and the ICWA

1207

2.4% of children in foster care.”49 In 1978, Congress depended on
research by the Association on American Indian Affairs,50 which at the
time was likely the only group conducting research on Indian child
welfare in the United States.51 Now, there is far more research and
Indigenous people are often part of the research teams.52 The recent
research confirms that structural racism is an inescapable part of state
child welfare systems even now.53
At the time Congress passed ICWA, state social services structures
had created procedural inequities as well. State social services workers
had enormous power over Indian families and could and did, for
example, threaten to terminate the welfare benefits of Indian parents and
custodians.54 That led Indian parents to consent to their children’s
49.
Disproportionality and Race Equity in Child Welfare, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/disproportionality-and-race-equity-in-child-welfare.aspx
[https://perma.cc/B8L5-5C42].
50.
H.R. REP. 95-1386, at 9 (citing AAIA surveys from 1969 and 1974).
51.
The Association’s executive director, Bill Byler, and counsel, Bert Hirsch,
were the first witnesses in the first Congressional hearing on the Indian child welfare crisis,
which took place in 1974. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearing on Problems that
American Indian Families Face in Raising Their Children and How These Problems Are
Affected by Federal Action or Inaction Before the Subcomm. On Indian Affs. of the Comm.
On Interior and Insular Affs. U.S. S., 93rd Cong. 3 (1974) [hereinafter Indian Child Welfare
Hearing] (statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association on American
Indian Affairs; accompanied by Bert Hirsch, Staff Attorney). For more on the origins of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, see generally Evelyn Lance Blanchard, To Prevent the
Breakup of the Indian Family: The Development of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(Sept. 10, 2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of New Mexico) (on file with The
University of New Mexico Digital Repository).
52.
See, e.g., Our Research Expertise, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N,
https://www.nicwa.org/our-research-expertise [https://perma.cc/QZ2H-UB33] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2022).
53.
See Thomas L. Crofoot & Marian S. Harris, An Indian Child Welfare
Perspective on Disproportionality in Child Welfare, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1667
(2012) (finding that institutional racism and biases are the root cause of disproportionality
in child removal rates); Terry L. Cross, Child Welfare in Indian Country: A Story of Painful
Removals, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 2256, 2258 (2014) (describing how “unconscious bias” and
“societal privileges” infect state child welfare decisions); Ann E. MacEachron & Nora
Gustavsson, Contemporary Policy Challenges for Indian Child Welfare, 9 J. POVERTY
43 (2005) (describing how state workers use poverty as a proxy for neglect in child
removal decisions). See generally Wendy Haight, Cary Waubanascum, David Glesener
& Scott Marsalis, A Scoping Study of Indigenous Child Welfare: The Long Emergency
and Preparations for the Next Seven Generations, 93 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 397,
403, 406–07 (2018) (aggregating results of thirty-seven empirical studies and concluding
that overrepresentation of Indian children in state child welfare system is due to poverty
and racism).
54.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (“Because of the availability of the waivers
and because a great number of Indian parents depend on welfare payments for survival,
they are exposed to the sometimes coercive arguments of welfare departments. . . . It is an
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removal and, later, adoption.55 There were economic incentives to
remove Indian children, too. Then and now, federal money pays for,
among other problematic incentives, foster care and provides incentives
for some people to foster as many children as possible.56
In short, when it comes to Indian parents and custodians, ICWA is
primarily a civil rights statute designed to combat longstanding personal
and institutional racism. Congress explicitly pointed to its powers under
the Commerce Clause and the trust relationship (the duty of protection)
as sources of its power to enact ICWA,57 but Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also is an important source of authority. ICWA is a rightscreating statute.

B. Brackeen v. Haaland
In Brackeen v. Haaland,58 the Fifth Circuit held that portions of
ICWA were unconstitutional for violating the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle and the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.59 An en banc majority of the Fifth
Circuit held that three provisions of ICWA unconstitutionally
commandeer state actors:60 (1) the active efforts requirement;61 (2) the
qualified expert witness requirement;62 and (3) the record keeping
provision.63 The court divided equally on whether ICWA’s placement
preferences64 and notice requirement65 unconstitutionally commandeer
state actors, affirming without precedential opinion the district court
unfortunate fact of life for many Indian parents that the primary service agency to which
they must turn for financial help also exercises police powers over their family life and is,
most frequently, the agency that initiates custody proceedings.”).
55.
Id. (“Many cases do not go through an adjudicatory process at all, since
the voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social workers to
gain custody of children.”).
56.
On the financial pressures in place at the time of ICWA’s enactment, see
id. (“Indian community leaders charge that federally subsidized foster care programs
encourage some non-Indian families to start ‘baby farms’ in order to supplement their
meager farm income with foster care payments and to obtain extra hands for
farmwork.”). On ongoing issues with financial incentives due to federal funding, see
generally Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled
Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281 (2007).
57.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(1).
58.
Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (per curiam),
cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022).
59.
Id. at 268–69.
60.
Id. at 268.
61.
§ 1912(d).
62.
§ 1912(e)–(f).
63.
§ 1915(e).
64.
§ 1915(a)–(b).
65.
§ 1912(a).
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ruling striking down those provisions.66 The State of Texas challenged
virtually all of ICWA’s provisions as contrary to the Tenth Amendment’s
anti-commandeering principle, but the Fifth Circuit let stand the
remainder of ICWA.67 The Supreme Court granted review.68
On the equal protection front, the Fifth Circuit was equally divided
on whether ICWA’s adoptive placement preference for “other Indian
families”69 and foster care placement preference for a licensed “Indian
foster home”70 violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.71 Because the district court struck
down those provisions, the lower court ruling was affirmed without a
precedential opinion.72 The en banc majority did confirm the
constitutionality of the remainder of ICWA,73 most notably the “Indian
child” classification.74
At no point did the Fifth Circuit address whether Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact ICWA to remedy
long-standing state discrimination against American Indian families on
the basis of race.
II. COMMANDEERING VERSUS PREEMPTION
The line between commandeering and preemption can be difficult to
discern. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has articulated a relatively
coherent set of principles for distinguishing between them. In this Part,
we first lay out the general principles of the anti-commandeering and
preemption doctrines. Then, we explain the distinctions that are
important in tough cases.

A. Commandeering
The Court has held that by virtue of the Tenth Amendment,
“Congress . . . lacks the power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit [certain] acts.”75 The Federal Government may not command
that “States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, . . .

66.
curiam).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 268 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (per
Id.
Brackeen v. Haaland, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022).
§ 1915(a)(3).
§ 1915(b)(iii).
Brackeen, 994 F.3d at 268.

Id.
Id. at 267–68.
Id.; § 1903(4).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
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administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”76 But exceptions to
this general principle have emerged since the Court first developed the
modern anti-commandeering principle in the 1990s. First, Congress may
validly issue commands to the states if it “evenhandedly regulates an
activity in which both States and private actors engage.”77 For example,
in Reno v. Condon, the Court held that a federal law restricting the
disclosure and dissemination of personal information provided in
applications for driver’s licenses validly applies to states because the law
regulated state and private actors equally.78 The rationale for this
exception is that generally applicable laws do not intrude on States’
sovereign authority to “regulate their own citizens.”79
Second (and most importantly for our purposes), there is also an
exception for when the Federal Government issues a command directed
at state courts (as opposed to the State’s legislative or executive
branches). Unlike state legislatures and executive branch agencies and
officials, state courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause to faithfully
apply federal law.80 The federal government, therefore, may command
state courts on how to apply federal law.81 State courts are distinct, the
Court has explained, because “unlike [state] legislatures and executives,
[courts] applied the law of other sovereigns all the time.”82 And it is wellestablished that Congress has the power to pass laws enforceable in state
courts.83

B. Preemption
When Congress creates individual rights under federal law, the
federal law preempts conflicting state laws; it is not commandeering. The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution84 specifies that

76.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
77.
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–79 (2018) (citing Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000)).
78.
Reno, 528 U.S. at 148.
79.
Id. at 151; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 555–56 (1985) (holding that Congress may regulate state and local governments as
employers through generally-applicable legislation).
80.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (“[T]he Constitution was originally understood to
permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar
as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power.”).
81.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79 (1992). For more
on the judicial commandeering exception, see Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 212–17.
82.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
83.
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 388, 394 (1947); see also Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37, (1876).
84.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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“federal law is supreme in case of a conflict with state law.”85 For federal
law to validly preempt state law, (1) the federal law must be one which
Congress may validly enact, and (2) it must regulate individuals, not
states.86
Federal law broadly recognizes three kinds of preemption
(depending on how you count). Express preemption exists when
Congress explicitly defines in a federal law the extent to which it
preempts state laws.87 When a federal law contains an express preemption
clause, the Court “focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.”88
Then, there are two kinds of implied preemption. Conflict
preemption occurs when it is physically impossible to comply with both
the federal and state law simultaneously, or when the state law stands in
direct contradiction to federal law.89 And lastly, field preemption occurs
when Congress’s “intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred
from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it’ . . . .”90
Sometimes, a federal law uses language that sounds like a command,
but is, in effect, a valid preemption clause because it creates federal
rights.91 In Murphy v. NCAA, the Court analyzed a statute providing
that “no State or political subdivision thereof . . . shall enact or enforce
any . . . provision . . . relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier [covered by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978].”92 Justice
Alito’s opinion for the Court explained that even “[t]hough this language
might appear to operate directly on the States . . . it is a mistake to be
confused by the way in which a preemption provision is phrased.”93 The
Court emphasized that “it is clear that this provision operates just like
any other federal law with preemptive effect” by conferring on private
entities “a federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to
certain (federal) constraints.”94

85.
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018).
86.
Id.
87.
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
88.
Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011)
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
89.
See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 493 (2013).
90.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399, 401 (2012) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
91.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
92.
Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988)) (citing Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992)).
93.
Id.
94.
Id. (emphasis added).
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III. ICWA’S RIGHTS CREATION IS PREEMPTION, NOT
COMMANDEERING

Applying these principles, it is clear that ICWA involves the
creation of individual rights in federal law and validly preempts contrary
state law without running afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle.
ICWA involves express preemption. It contains an express
preemption provision,95 which reads as follows:
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child
custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a
higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or
Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided
under this subsection, the State or Federal court shall apply the
State or Federal standard.96
As we explained, preemption is a question of Congressional intent, and
the best evidence of Congress’s preemptive intent is Congress’s own
words. used. The plain language of the preemption provision here
suggests that Congress intended the substantive provisions of ICWA to
provide a floor preempting all state laws with less protective standards,
but not to displace state laws that provide a higher standard.
ICWA imparts Indian custodial parents with substantive rights under
federal law without invalidly commanding state governments to take
specific action. For federal law to validly preempt state law, the federal
law must (1) represent the “exercise” of a valid Congressional power and
(2) must regulate individuals, not States.97 It is beyond dispute that ICWA
is an exercise of valid Congressional power and imparts individual Indian
parents with rights safeguarding their custodial relationships with their
children.

A. ICWA is a Valid Exercise of Congressional Power
It is well established that Congress possesses plenary power in
Indian affairs by virtue of numerous provisions of the Constitution, as
well as the structure of the Constitution, and through treaties made with
Indian tribes.98 The Supreme Court has pointed to the Commerce Clause,
the Treaty Power, the Property and Territory Clause, and even the
preconstitutional powers of the United States as sources of this
95.
96.
97.
98.

See 25 U.S.C. § 1921.

Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
RESTATEMENT L. AM. INDIANS, supra note 13, § 7.
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Congressional power.99 The Court has also held that the relationship
between Indian tribes and the United States, known since the Founding
as the “duty of protection,” is also a source of Congressional power.100
When it enacted ICWA, Congress pointed to several constitutional
provisions that form the basis for federal plenary power in Indian affairs,
specifically naming the Commerce Clause, but also asserting “other
constitutional authority.”101
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to Congress’s power
over Indian Affairs as “plenary,”102 and has explained that the “central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause . . . is to provide Congress with
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”103 This “plenary”
and “broad” power—which the Court has said includes the power to take
dramatic measures such as defining the scope or even extinguishing the
sovereign powers of tribes—certainly includes the authority to enact
ICWA, a modest set of procedural safeguards to protect Indian parents’
custodial rights over their children.

B. ICWA Creates Individual Federal Rights
All the provisions of ICWA challenged in Brackeen involve the
creation of federal rights in individual Indian parents concerning their
custodial relationships over their children. In Brackeen, the Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that the active efforts requirement,104 the qualified

99.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–01, 203 (2004).
100. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal
government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
581–82 (1832) (“By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the
protection of the United States: they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them
of the right of self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or
compacts.”).
101. § 1901(1).
102. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general
powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described
as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1979); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993).
103. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of
N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982) (referring to “broad power” under the Indian Commerce
Clause); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
104. § 1912(d) (requiring that any party seeking a change of status of an Indian
child under State law show that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs and that those efforts have proved unsuccessful).
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expert witness requirements,105 and the recordkeeping provision106 of
ICWA unconstitutionally commandeer state actors.107 Additionally, an
equally divided court affirmed without precedential opinion the district
court’s ruling that ICWA’s placement preference requirements,108 notice
provision,109
and
adoption
record
reporting
provision110
111
unconstitutionally commandeer state actors.
All these provisions are valid and do not violate the anticommandeering principle. The active efforts requirement, § 1912 (d),
operates as a legal standard on parties seeking to bring an action to
change the status of an Indian child in state court: the state court must be
satisfied that the party seeking the change of status of the Indian child
has attempted to resolve the matter though specific out-of-court channels
and that those efforts have proven unsuccessful.112 The measure is
consistent with ICWA’s purpose of creating a federal right to protect
Indian parents’ custodial relationship with their children. Procedural
burdens or exhaustion requirements such as the active efforts requirement
are unremarkable and can be found throughout the United States Code.113
The provision supplies a legal standard for state courts to apply and in
no way commands the states’ legislative or executive branches to act in
any specific manner. And if that were not enough, we also point out that
105. § 1912(e) (providing that no Indian child may be placed in foster care
without a determination “supported by clear and convincing evidence, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses,” that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child); § 1912 (f) (providing that a court may not terminate parental rights over an
Indian child in the absence of “a determination, supported by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses,” that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child).
106. § 1915(e) (requiring that a record of each adoptive placement of an Indian
child made in state courts under State law be maintained by the State in which the
placement was made and that such records be made available at any time upon the request
of the Secretary of Interior or the Indian child’s tribe).
107. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 268 (5th Cir. 2021).
108. § 1915(a) (specifying a preferential order of placement in the event of an
adoptive placement of an Indian child: (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2)
other members of the child’s tribe; and (3) other Indian families); § 1915 (b) (specifying
a similar preferential order of placement in the event of a foster care placement).
109. § 1912(a) (requiring any party seeking the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child to notify the parent or Indian custodian
and the Indian child’s tribe of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention).
110. § 1951(a) (requiring state courts entering final decrees or orders in Indian
child adoptive placements to provide the Secretary of Interior with a copy of the decree).
111. Brackeen, 994 F.3d at 268.
112. § 1912(d).
113. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (requiring federal habeas petitioners to
exhaust all remedies available in state court before a federal court may adjudicate their
claims on the merits).
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the provision imposes an evenhanded burden on all parties who bring
such suits, whether it be a state agency or a private individual. The
provision by its own terms applies to “[a]ny party seeking” a change in
status.114 So, it would fall within the exception to the anti-commandeering
principle which permits Congress to validly issue commands to the states
if it “evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private
actors engage.”115
The qualified expert witness requirements, § 1912(e)–(f), similarly
provide unremarkable legal standards for state courts to apply and in no
way command a state’s executive or legislative branches to do
anything.116 Section 1912(e) requires that a state court make a specific
finding supported by “clear and convincing evidence,” and requires
specific evidence in the form of qualified expert witness testimony,
before placing an Indian child in foster care.117 Similarly, § 1912(f)
requires that a state court make a specific finding “beyond a reasonable
doubt,” and requires specific evidence in the form of a qualified expert
witness’s testimony, before terminating a custodian’s parental rights over
an Indian child.118 “Clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt” are routine legal standards. Statutory rules requiring
evidence be of a certain form are also common throughout the United
States Code.119 Similarly, ICWA’s placement preference requirements, §
1915(a)–(b), specify a preferential order of placement in the event of an
adoption or foster care placement.120 This is another run-of-the-mill legal
standard applied by the state courts and similarly does not impose any
command on a state’s executive or legislative branches.
ICWA’s placement preference requirements, notice provision, and
adoption recordkeeping provision also easily pass constitutional muster.
The notice provision, § 1912(a), requires that “the party seeking the
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child” notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe
of the pending proceedings and of their right to intervene.121 Like the
“active efforts” requirement, it is a valid, evenhanded regulation which
applies to any party seeking to bring a child status action in state court,
whether it is a state agency or a private party.122
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (emphasis added).
115. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–79 (2018) (citing Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000)).
116. See § 1921(e)–(f).
117. § 1912(e).
118. § 1912(f).
119. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(F) (requiring evidence of social security
account in a specific form before benefits may be paid).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)–(b).
121. § 1912(a).
122. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–79 (2018).
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The adoption record reporting provision, § 1951(a), imposes a
reporting obligation on state courts. It requires state courts entering final
decrees or orders in Indian child adoptive placements to provide the
Secretary of Interior with a copy of the decree.123 Printz v. United States
strongly suggested in dicta that federal statutes imposing reporting and
administrative requirements on state courts do not violate the anticommandeering principle and pointed to a long history of federal statutes
imposing reporting requirements on state courts.124 For example, Printz
notes that the first Congresses required state courts to record applications
for citizenship,125 to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and
other naturalization records to the Secretary of State,126 and to register
aliens seeking naturalization and issue certificates of registry.127 A
requirement that state courts report records of adoptions of Indian
children to the Secretary of the Interior is in line with the types of
reporting requirements Congress has imposed on state courts since 1790.
It would be quite a radical step for today’s Court to find such a
requirement unconstitutional.
In our view, the state recordkeeping provision, § 1915(e), is the
only ICWA provision where compliance with the anti-commandeering
principle is not so clear-cut.128 This provision requires that the State in
which an adoption placement of an Indian child is made maintain records
of the placement and that such records be made available at any time
upon the request of the Secretary of Interior or the Indian child’s tribe.129
The plain language of the provision seems to impose a command, albeit
a modest one, on state governments in requiring them to maintain such
records. But the Court in Murphy v. NCAA130 reminds us not “to be
confused by the way in which a provision is framed,” and instead to look
to the way in which it operates,131 and the provision here does not specify
which branch of the “state” is obligated. It could be plausibly interpreted
as imposing a recordkeeping requirement on the state court system. Such
a recordkeeping requirement would be consistent with the type of

04).
567).
55).

123.
124.
125.

§ 1951(a).

126.

Id. at 905–06 (citing Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 566,

127.

Id. at 906 (citing Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, sec. 2, 2 Stat. 153, 154–

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–07 (1997).
Id. at 905 (citing Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–

128. § 1915(e) (requiring that a record of each adoptive placement of an Indian
child made in state courts under State law be maintained by the State in which the
placement was made and that such records be made available at any time upon the request
of the Secretary of Interior or the Indian child’s tribe).
129. Id.
130. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
131. Id. at 1480.
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administrative obligations Congress has imposed on state courts since the
Founding132 and is incidental to Congress’s power to obligate state courts
to apply federal law.133
Ultimately, the state recordkeeping provision is inconsequential. So
long as the reporting requirement (that state courts provide record of
adoption placements to the Secretary of the Interior) is in effect (and
again, we believe it should easily pass constitutional muster), there is not
a lot gained in requiring states to maintain the same records as well. But
still—it is hard to imagine why a state would insist on refusing to maintain
such records.
IV. EVEN IF IT’S COMMANDEERING, IT’S REMEDIAL COMMANDEERING
When it enacted ICWA, Congress pointed to several constitutional
provisions that form the basis for federal plenary power in Indian affairs,
specifically naming the Commerce Clause, but also asserting “other
constitutional authority.”134 It seems clear to us that one of those other
sources is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.135 We argue that even
if that the provisions ICWA constituted impermissible commandeering,
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a potent source of
Congressional authority that authorizes Congress to remedy state
discrimination against American Indian people—potent enough to
authorize the Indian Child Welfare Act.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying due
process or equal protection of the law to any person.136 Section 1 provides
in relevant part, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”137 Section 5 is an
enforcement mechanism, authorizing Congress to enact legislation to
ensure states comply: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”138
Congressional power under Section 5 is sufficient to abrogate
aspects of state sovereignty (and, we argue, override any anticommandeering concern) so long as the federal legislation fulfills the
Supreme Court’s “congruence and proportionality” test. For Congress’s
132. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–07 (1997).
133. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–91 (1947).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1).
135. Cf. Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27 & n.1
(2003) (upholding application of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to the state
of Nevada under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment even though Congress did not
explicitly invoke Section 5).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 5.

1218

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end,” and the remedies authorized by the
Congressional action must sufficiently connect to conduct courts have
held to be in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.139 We
argue that so long as ICWA satisfies this test, it should override any anticommandeering concern.
In Section IV.A, we describe the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Indian Affairs. In Sections IV.B–C, we show how ICWA
complies with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Section IV.B,
we offer three theories of connections between the remedial measures
within ICWA and violations of Constitutional rights. And in Section
IV.C, we explain argue that ICWA’s remedial measures are congruent
and proportional to the Constitutional injuries ICWA was meant to
address.

A. The Fourteenth Amendment in Indian Affairs
At the time of its enactment, the primary thrust of the Fourteenth
Amendment—to guarantee citizenship to all persons born in the United
States140 and to eliminate the “three-fifths of all other Persons”
euphemism from the Constitution141—passed American Indian people by.
In Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress retained the term
of art, “Indians not taxed,” from the Enumeration Clause of Article I.142
In 1870, the Senate explicitly stated that Indian citizenship was unaffected
by the amendment.143 The Supreme Court agreed a few years later.144
Only Congress could extend citizenship to Indians, via an Act of
Congress.145 Congress did extend citizenship to many Indian people,
usually through the allotment process, from 1870 to 1924.146 All
remaining American Indians received their citizenship through the 1924
Citizenship Act.147 The Fourteenth Amendment seemingly affirmed the
understanding, wrongly, that Indian people did not possess individual
rights except those established by Congress.
139. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Id. § 2.
142. Id.
143. S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 1 (1870) (“That in the opinion of your committee the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution has no effect whatever upon the status of the
Indian tribes within the limits of the United States . . . .”).
144. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
145. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.8, at 95 (2016).
146. Id. at 96.
147. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1401).
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Even so, the Fourteenth Amendment protects Indian people,
regardless of citizenship, from discrimination by states. Section 1 forbids
states from denying equal protection and due process to “any person,”
which of course includes Indian people.148 Courts have assessed whether
states have violated the Equal Protection Clause in numerous contexts,
for example, education,149 religious freedom,150 taxation,151 contracts,152
and voting rights.153
The overwhelming majority of cases involving Indian people and the
Fourteenth Amendment are brought, however, by non-Indians who claim
that Indian affairs laws or their implementation violate the rights of the
non-Indians. States and their citizens have argued that the rights of Indian
people to hunt and fish (largely) free of state control, rights guaranteed
by treaties, statutes, or other federal laws, violate the equal protection
principle.154 Non-Indian government employees have argued that
employment preferences provided by statute to employees of agencies
providing services to Indian people violate the equal protection
principle.155 The list goes on. In 2022, for example, non-Indians

148. E.g., Meyers ex rel. Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F.
Supp. 1544, 1571 (D. Utah 1995) (“The District’s failure to provide education services [to
Indian students] at Navajo Mountain may still violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
149. Id. at 1544.
150. E.g., Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (noting
that discrimination against Native prisoners can violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
151. E.g., United States v. Ferry County, 24 F. Supp. 399, 400 (E.D. Wash.
1938) (holding Indian tax immunity was vested property interest that could not be
impaired by state action).
152. E.g., Bradley v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 141 P.2d 524, 524, 526 (Ariz.
1943) (holding that denial of a contract motor carrier permit to plaintiff, a “full blooded
Navajo Indian” on the sole ground that plaintiff was an Indian and a “ward of the United
States government” was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
153. E.g., Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, 929 F.3d 1270, 1282, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2019) (holding county’s districting for school board and county commission were
racially discriminatory); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1019 (D.S.D.
2004) (“Here, there is substantial evidence that South Dakota officially excluded Indians
from voting and holding office.”).
154. E.g., Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (“[T]he peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf . . . .”).
155. E.g., Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (affirming state Indian preference in employment for state school districts
in Indian country and concluding that “[t]he trust doctrine also applies to state action.
‘State action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under the trust doctrine and therefore
be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights statutes’”)
(cleaned up).
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challenged tribal gaming compacts,156 directly in the face of clear
precedent favoring the constitutionality of the compacts.157
These claims almost always fail, and rightfully so. The United States
owes a duty of protection to Indian tribes and individual Indians, a duty
acknowledged implicitly in the structure of the Constitution.158 That duty
requires and authorizes Congress and states to enact Indian affairs laws
that treat Indians and tribes differently.159 So long as an Indian affairs
statute is rationally related to the fulfillment of the duty of protection, the
law is constitutionally valid.160
The challenges do not stop. American law is nothing if not effective
at reproducing dominion, hierarchy, and power.161 American law also
privileges compartmentalization. No suit challenging an Indian affairs
statute begins with a recitation of the sorry history of the government’s
treatment of Indians and tribes. The challenges always start with an outof-context, side-by-side description of Indian-versus-non-Indian
treatment. The same Indian affairs principle that exists today that allows
the government to privilege Indian and tribal interests also allowed the
United States in years past to confiscate Indian lands,162 terminate Indian
tribes,163 and dominate Indian families.164 Where were these civil rights
crusaders then?
156. See Complaint ¶ 5, Maverick Gaming LLC v. United States, No. 1:22-cv00068 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022) (“Washington’s tribal monopoly is inconsistent with IGRA
and federal criminal statutes, which prohibit class III gaming activity by tribal casinos on
Indian lands unless a State permits the same activity by non-tribal entities. The tribal
monopoly also violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws by
irrationally and impermissibly discriminating on the basis of race and ancestry.”).
157. Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 734 (9th Cir.
2003).
158. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal
government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.”).
159. RESTATEMENT L. AM. INDIANS, supra note 13, § 9(a).
160. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward
the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”).
161. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 842–44 (1997)
(explaining how the law reflects “dominant interests and fosters structural ‘oppression
less by coercion than by offering people identifies contingent upon their acceptance of
oppression as defining characteristics of their very selves’”).
162. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
163. Cf. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)
(impliedly recognizing power of Congress to terminate its duty of protection to Indian
tribes).
164. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian
Children and the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, 95 NEB. L. REV. 885, 892–929
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In the 1970s, the United States government finally began to take
steps to remedy the ongoing harms it perpetrated against Indian people.
One key statute, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, is now the target
of a concerted effort to undermine Indian affairs.

B. Sufficient Connection to Constitutional Violations
Remedial legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is valid “only if it sufficiently connects to conduct courts
have held Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] to proscribe.”165 To
evaluate this, courts look to “the legislative record” Congress had before
it showing evidence of a “constitutional wrong.”166
Congress purported to enact ICWA to serve the following purposes:
(3) [T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and
that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in
protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in nonIndian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential
tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.167
There is ample evidence in ICWA’s legislative record to support
three theories of enforcement of constitutional rights: (1) the procedural
due process rights of Indian families in the way their children were
separated; (2) the substantive due process rights of Indian families to
raise their children as they saw fit in their cultures; and (3) violations of
the equal protection clause in the ways in which states applied family
laws against Indian families.
Procedural Due Process. Procedural due process imposes
constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
(2017) (describing early American history of federal government intervention into Indian
families’ lives).
165. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (citing Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999)).
166. Id.
167. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)–(5).
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“liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.168 The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”169 The specific dictates of
due process requires the balancing of three factors, known as Eldridge
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.170 In the context of termination of
parental rights, or parents facing the removal of their children the need
for procedural protections is “critical.”171 As a per se rule based on a
balancing of the Eldridge factors, the Court has held that the Due Process
Clause requires the party seeking to alter or end parental rights prove
their allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.172
The House and Senate Reports noted a pattern of Indian parents
being deprived of their children in violation of their right to procedural
due process. The Senate Report noted the following:
Studies by the Association on American Indian Affairs, State
Welfare offices and private child welfare groups indicated that
in some areas as high as 25 percent of all Indian children are
being placed in institutions or in foster or adoptive homes,
usually with non-Indian families. The studies also indicated that
such family breakups frequently occur as a result of conditions
which are temporary or remedial and where the Indian people
involved do not understand the nature of the legal actions
involved.173
Similarly, the House Report found that states denied basic
procedural rights to Indian parents by denying them access to counsel or
expert witnesses.174 The cultural disconnect between state workers who
favored the nuclear family and the Indian families who culturally did not,
plus power dynamics favoring the state, led to serious harms:

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
factors).
173.
174.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
See id. at 764, 769 (basing analysis on the balancing of the three Eldridge
S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 11 (1977).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978).

2022:1199

Preemption, Commandeering, and the ICWA

1223

The conflict between Indian and non-Indian social systems
operates to defeat due process. The extended family provides
an example. By sharing the responsibility of child rearing, the
extended family tends to strengthen the community’s
commitment to the child. At the same time, however, it
diminishes the possibility that the nuclear family will be able to
mobilize itself quickly enough when an outside agency acts to
assume custody. Because it is not unusual for Indian children
to spend considerable time away with other relatives, there is
no immediate realization of what is happening—possibly not
until the opportunity for due process has slipped away.175
Together, the Senate and House Report indicate thorough
documentation of a pattern by which Indian children are removed from
their families without due process. Although the Supreme Court decision
that specified the procedural due process standard for deprivation of
parental rights was not announced until 1982,176 years after ICWA was
passed in 1978, the legislative record shows ample evidence of a pattern
of Indian families being deprived of their constitutional right to
procedural due process in the ways in which their children were separated
from them.
Substantive Due Process. The Supreme Court has long recognized
that a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care,
and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 In Meyer v. Nebraska178 and
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,179
the Supreme Court recognized “the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control” to be
a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.180 Although the

Id.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v.
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a parent’s desire for and right
175.
176.
177.

to “the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children” is an
important interest that “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000).
178. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
179. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
180. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
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Court’s recent decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health181 has
called into question the future of substantive due process,182 Professor
Laurence Tribe has called Meyer and Pierce “the two sturdiest pillars of
the substantive due process temple” and has noted that the line of cases
establishing the fundamental right to family integrity free from arbitrary
government interference has survived on strong footing.183
The House Report documents a pattern by which Indian children are
removed from Indian families resulting in a violation of Indian families’
substantive due process right to rear their children as they see fit.184 The
report states, “[i]n judging the fitness of a particular family, many social
workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make
decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family
life and so they frequently discover neglect or abandonment where none
exists.”185 Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters stand for
the principle that parents’ right to raise their children as they see fit, in
whichever culture or religion they choose, is protected by the Due
Process Clause. By unfairly labeling these cultural practices as “neglect”
or “abandonment,” social workers were engaged in a pattern of denying
Indian families the right to raise their children in their cultures. This is
analogous to Meyer, which held that Nebraska’s criminalization of
teaching children the German language denied parents the right to direct
the upbringing of their children,186 and to Pierce, which held that
prohibition of sending children to Catholic schools violated parents’
rights to rear their children as they saw fit.187
Equal Protection. The virulent race discrimination of the pre-ICWA
era certainly implicates the Equal Protection Clause. When courts
evaluate state conduct for an equal protection violation, “[r]acial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination.”188 A showing of disparate impact
alone is not sufficient to state an equal protection claim.189 A plaintiff
181. 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) (overruling nearly 50 years of precedent
establishing a right to abortion under the doctrine of substantive due process).
182. See Reva Siegel, Memory Games: Dobbs’s Originalism as AntiDemocratic Living Constitutionalism—and Some Pathways for Resistance, 101 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 53–64), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4179622
[https://perma.cc/H4WW-75MA].
183. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That
Dare Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1934 (2004).
184. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11–12.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
187. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
188. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
189. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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must show a racially discriminatory intent, which may be evidenced by
such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the
challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from
normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the
decisionmakers.190 Plaintiffs may show an equal protection violation
through “persuasive circumstantial evidence” that race was the
government actor’s “dominant and controlling rationale.”191 “[A]n
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality
of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears
more heavily on one race than another.”192 Courts have held that Indians
are denied equal protection of law when a government actor acts in a
manner that is impermissibly motivated by their race.193 This is
straightforward equal protection which courts have long recognized.
The House Report documented ample evidence that Indian families
were denied equal protection in the discriminatory application of family
laws against them compared to non-Indians.194 It noted the disturbing
frequency at which Indian children were separated from their families—
“approximately 25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated from
their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or
institutions.”195 The House Report also noted the shocking disparity in
the rates at which Indian children are separated from their families
compared with non-Indian children.196
While disparate impact alone is not enough to show a violation of
the Equal Protection clause, the House Report also documents evidence
of discriminatory intent. For example, it notes that abuse of alcohol is
disproportionately cited as grounds for separating Indian children from
their families; non-Indian families were not targeted for alcoholism at the

190. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264–68 (1977).
191. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913, 916 (1995).
192. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (1976).
193. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1182–
83 (D. Utah 2016).
194. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9–10 (1978).
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id. (“The disparity in placement rates for Indians and non-Indians is
shocking. In Minnesota, Indian children are placed in foster care or in adoptive homes at
a per capita rate five times greater than non-Indian children. In Montana, the ratio of
Indian foster-care placement is at least 13 times greater. In South Dakota, 40 percent of
all adoptions made by the State’s Department of Public Welfare since 1967-68 are of
Indian children, yet Indians make up only 7 percent, of the juvenile population. The
number of South Dakota Indian children living in foster homes is per capita, nearly 16
times greater than the non-Indian rate. In the State of Washington, the Indian adoption
rate is 19 times greater and the foster care rate 10 times greater. In Wisconsin, the risk
run by Indian children of being separated from their parents is nearly 1,600 percent [17
times] greater than it is for non-Indian children.”).
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same rate.197 The report also notes that discriminatory standards have
made it difficult for Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents
“since they are based on middle-class values.”198 Tribal leaders had been
arguing that Indian families of “modest means” could serve as foster or
adoptive parents, but state actors ignored them.199 Congress showed an
awareness of the fact that cultural differences among Indians was a reason
why they often did not qualify as foster parents or adoptive parents. With
all this evidence, Congress could conclude that there was a pattern in
which states applied their family laws unfairly against Indian families in
violation of the Equal Protection clause.

C. Congruence and Proportionality
For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “[t]here
must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”200 Some
scholars have explained that Congress may validly abrogate aspects of
states’ sovereignty by issuing affirmative commands to states that might
otherwise run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering
principle when it acts under its Section 5 enforcement powers.201 Recent
cases concerning Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reflect a broader theory
of abrogation of state sovereignty, of which immunity from suit is but
one aspect. For example, Alden v. Maine202 grounded the concept of state
sovereignty in the Tenth Amendment in addition to the Eleventh
Amendment.203 Under a theory of remedial commandeering, the
congruence and proportionality test that is used to determine whether

197. Id. at 10 (“One of the grounds most frequently advanced for taking Indian
children from their parents is the abuse of alcohol. However, this standard is applied
unequally. In areas where rates of problem drinking among Indians and non-Indians are
the same, it is rarely applied against non-Indian parents. Once again cultural biases
frequently affect decisionmaking.”).
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. (“Recognizing that in some instances it is necessary to remove children
from their homes, community leaders argue that there are Indian families within the tribe
who could provide excellent care, although they are of modest means.”).
200. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
201. See Rebecca Aviel, Remedial Commandeering, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1999, 2005 (2021) (“If Congress has satisfied City of Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test, then . . . . Congress should be—and to this point always has been—
free to regulate in a manner that issues direct orders to state actors.”).
202. 527 U.S. 706 (U.S. 1999).
203. Id. at 749 (“A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to
coerce the other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to turn the State
against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State
against its will and at the behest of individuals.”).
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Congress has validly abrogated the sovereign immunity of states may be
applied to determine when Congress has validly “commandeered” the
states by issuing them an affirmative command.
ICWA’s remedial provisions are congruent and proportional to the
record of constitutional violations Congress had before it. Much of
ICWA consists of safeguards to ensure fairness in proceedings involving
the termination of parental rights of an Indian child. For example,
Congress enacted the active efforts provision in response to the stark
frequency of the constitutional violations,204 which mandates that “any
party seeking to effect [the change of status of an] Indian child under
State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have
proved unsuccessful.” This provision is proportional to the astonishing
frequency of the problem Congress had identified, that Indian children
were removed from their families at a shockingly disproportionately high
rate and that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children at
the time ICWA was enacted were removed from their families.
The provisions requiring the expert witnesses in foster care
placement and termination of parental right proceedings are also
proportional to the extent of the pattern of Constitutional violations
Congress found. ICWA requires that:
[N]o foster care placement may be ordered in [a foster care
placement proceeding where the court knows or has reason to
know that an Indian child is involved] in the absence of a
determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence,
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian
is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child.205
ICWA also requires that:
[N]o termination of parental rights may be ordered in [a
termination of parental rights proceeding where the court
knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved]
in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the

204.
205.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
§ 1912(e).
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parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.206
Congress believed that not relying on expert witnesses was one of
the primary reasons behind disparate outcomes in states’ application of
family laws.207 Congress specifically identified courts’ reliance on social
workers who lacked cultural competence.208 By requiring states to furnish
an expert witness in these proceedings, Congress went no further than
necessary to remedy this cause of the pattern of constitutional violations.
Although Congress specified a “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of
proof, which goes beyond the “clear and convincing” burden of proof
required by the Constitution in parental termination proceedings,
Congress may have concluded that this prophylactic measure was
necessary given the widespread problem it was tackling. Such a
prophylactic measure is acceptable. The Court has held that “Section 5
allows Congress to ‘enact[] reasonably prophylactic legislation’ to deter
constitutional harm.”209
The recordkeeping requirements are also proportional to the pattern
of Constitutional violations Congress found. ICWA states:
[A] record of each [adoptive] placement, under State law, of an
Indian child shall be maintained by the State in which the
placement was made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the
order of preference specified in this section. Such record shall
be made available at any time upon the request of the Secretary
or the Indian child’s tribe.210
ICWA provides that any State court entering a final order in any Indian
child adoptive placement shall provide the Secretary with a copy of such
order along with specified information.211 Given the widespread nature
of the problem and gaps in information that Congress identified (e.g.,
noting that not all states kept detailed records like Minnesota), Congress
may have concluded that this recordkeeping was necessary to allow it to
better quantify the scale of the problem and to measure the effect of the
remedial measures it enacted.212

206.
207.
208.
209.

§ 1912(f).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978).
Id. at 10–11.
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 99, 1004 (2020) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
210. § 1915(e).
211. § 1951(a).
212. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
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The placement preferences privileging Indian adoptive and foster
parents213 come in response to testimony made during the Congressional
hearings leading up to ICWA explaining that the states intentionally
placed Indian children removed from their homes in non-Indian homes214
and, further, that states discriminated against Indian potential foster and
adoptive parents. State actors believed without evidence that growing up
Indian on an Indian reservation with Indian family members was the
worst thing possible for an American child and acted accordingly.
ICWA’s notice provision requires that in any State court proceeding
seeking foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an
Indian child, the party seeking the action shall notify the parent or Indian
custodian and the Indian child’s tribe.215 ICWA also mandates a certain
period of time to allow the Indian parents and the tribe to respond.216
These requirements serve the clear remedial purpose of redressing the
pattern of Constitutional violations Congress found. Congress noted that
Indian children are frequently removed from their families without
affording the Indian families their constitutionally required procedural
due process rights.
CONCLUSION
The Indian Child Welfare Act continues to be an important statute.
Race discrimination by state actors, after all, cannot be legislated away.
Consider the suit brought by the Oglala Sioux Tribe against state judges
in Rapid City, South Dakota, Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik.217 The
court found that the practices of state judges, led by Judge Jeff Davis,
routinely violated Indian parents’ and custodians’ due process rights:
Judge Davis does not permit Indian parents to present evidence
opposing the State’s petition for temporary custody. Judge
Davis prevents Indian parents from cross-examining any of the
State’s witnesses who would support of the petition. Judge
Davis does not require the States Attorney or [Department of
Social Services] to call witnesses to support removal of Indian
children nor does Judge Davis permit testimony as to whether

213. § 1915(a)–(b).
214. Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 51, at 5 (estimating ninety
percent of Indian children removed were placed with non-Indian families).
215. § 1912(a).
216. Id.
217. 100 F. Supp. 3d 749 (D.S.D. 2015), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir 2018).
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a removed child is in immediate risk of harm if returned to her
parents.218
The court added further that Judge Davis’ practices plainly violate
ICWA:
Judge Davis does not conduct any inquiry during the 48–hour
hearings to determine whether emergency removal remains
necessary. He permits no testimony by the Indian parents or
presentation of testimony by the tribal attorney to determine
whether the risk of imminent physical harm has passed.
Contrary to the clear intent of ICWA, the [Department of the
Interior] Guidelines and the [South Dakota] Guidelines, all of
which contemplate evidence will be presented on the record in
open court, Judge Davis relies on the ICWA affidavit and
petition for temporary custody which routinely are disclosed
only to him and not to the Indian parents, their attorney or
custodians. These undisclosed documents are not subject to
cross-examination or challenge by the presentation of
contradictory evidence.219
The federal district court concluded that the Rapid City judiciary’s
practices violated the Due Process Clause:
Judge Davis and the other defendants failed to protect
Indian parents’ fundamental rights to a fair hearing by not
allowing them to present evidence to contradict the State’s
removal documents. The defendants failed by not allowing the
parents to confront and cross-examine DSS witnesses. The
defendants failed by using documents as a basis for the court’s
decisions which were not provided to the parents and which
were not received in evidence at the 48–hour hearings.
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
their Due Process Clause claims.220
In short, the “wholesale” removal of Indian children from their
Indian parents and custodians that so concerned Congress in 1978221
never stopped in Rapid City.
Van Hunnik is perhaps an extreme example, but recent studies
conclude that state court compliance with ICWA is unusually rare. In
2015, a Casey Family Programs study found that state compliance with
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 764.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 772.
H. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).

2022:1199

Preemption, Commandeering, and the ICWA

1231

ICWA was “inconsistent.”222 Another study found that adoption attorneys
often intentionally violate or subvert compliance with ICWA.223 This
year, scholars reviewing ICWA compliance studies found that tribes do
not receive notice of ICWA-eligible cases, children are under-identified
as Indian children, ICWA cases are treated the same as non-ICWA cases,
and more.224 One consequence to the lack of compliance is that “Native
American children are continuously overrepresented at alarmingly high
rates in the child welfare system.”225
Other states go the opposite direction, going so far as to codify and
domesticate ICWA. Ten states, most recently New Mexico’s Indian
Family Preservation Act,226 have adopted such laws.227 State laws enacted
in furtherance of the federal government’s duty of protection to Indians
and Indian tribes are valid under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.228 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court roundly
approved of and broadly applied the Washington Indian Child Welfare
Act, which extended protections to Indian children where their parents
were not yet enrolled as a tribal citizen.229 ICWA defines “Indian child”
as one who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is the biological child
of a tribal member.230 The court relied on ICWA, but in an important
alternative holding, concluded that the state statute alone was a sufficient
and valid basis for reaching that conclusion.231
222. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, A RESEARCH AND PRACTICE BRIEF: MEASURING
COMPLIANCE
WITH
THE
INDIAN
CHILD
WELFARE
ACT
6
(2015),
https://theacademy.sdsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/measuring-compliance-icwabrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KDK-HR9B]; see also JUSTINE VAN STRAATEN & PAUL G.
BUCHBINDER, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT:
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE THROUGH STATE-TRIBAL COOPERATION 1 (2011),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ICWA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HUS2-NFJN].
223. Gregory D. Smith, ICWA Adoptions: An Indian Child Welfare Act
Primer, 5 ACCORD, LEGAL J. FOR PRAC. 81, 89–91 (2016).
224. Melanie Sage & Carenlee Barkdull, Operationalizing ICWA Compliance
to Improve Native American Child & Family Outcomes, 73 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 7, 10
(2022).
225. Id. at 9.
226. H.B. 135, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2022).
227. Comprehensive
State
ICWA
Laws,
TURTLE
TALK,
https://turtletalk.blog/icwa/comprehensive-state-icwa-laws
[https://perma.cc/JZ43U4KD] (listing the ten states which have adopted ICWA laws).
228. RESTATEMENT L. AM. INDIANS, supra note 13, § 9(b); see also Washington
v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979)
(holding that while states “do not enjoy [the federal government’s] unique relationship
with Indians,” state laws “enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to
readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians,” for example, will be judged under
the rational-basis test).
229. In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 196 Wash. 2d 152, 175 (2020).
230. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
231. Z.J.G., 196 Wash. 2d at 183–84.
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All of this is to say that twenty percent of states have endorsed
ICWA through positive legislation adopting or domesticating the law.232
These states have learned the ICWA lesson.
Where state actors comply with ICWA, success stories abound.
Consider the story of Chief Judge Allie Greenleaf Maldonado, a citizen
of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians:
I am looking at a picture of a beautiful little boy who is a
citizen of the Little River Band of Odawa Indians. He is my
son. He became my son because of ICWA.
His 14-year-old biological mother ran away to Nevada
where she gave birth. The State of Nevada immediately took
custody of the baby and placed him into a non-relative, nonIndian placement. However, the Little River Band was properly
notified and the tribe intervened. The good people of Nevada
wanted to follow ICWA and so they asked the tribe for an
appropriate placement.
If they had not followed ICWA, under Nevada law, the
family that brought him home from the hospital would have
maintained custody and would have had the first right to adopt
him if no family members came forward. They were very nice
people, great people, but they had no ties to the Native
community whatsoever. My son would have been brought up
thousands of miles from his tribe and his culture but for ICWA.
However, because he is Indian, and Nevada followed
federal law, he was transported back to Michigan and placed
into foster care with my husband and me. I am from a sister
tribe and member of the same clan as my son, so the tribe
decided we were an appropriate placement. After about two
years of trying to reunite him with his birth mother, both birth
parents voluntarily gave up their parental rights and we were
allowed to adopt him.233
In the Anishinaabe traditional creation stories, Gitchi Manitou (the
great mystery) created Anishinaabewaki (the world).234 The first human
beings were created and introduced into Anishinaabewaki last.235 They
were physically weak compared to other entities and creatures already
232.
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present in and around the world, creatures like mukwaag (bears) and
entities like animikiiwaag (thunderers).236 But these had two great
powers: independence and the power to dream. These earliest humans
forgot the Ki Inaakonigewin (great laws), which angered Gitchi Manitou.
They sent a great flood and destroyed all of Anishinaabewaki, including
all of the Anishinaabeg.237 There was one creature who remained,
Gizhigokwe (Sky Woman), who lived in the sky. Gizhigokwe descended
onto the world, landing on the back of mikinaak (turtle) and created new
people, known as the Anishinaabeg.238 These Anishinaabeg were
different than the earlier people. They were not made of earth, water,
fire, and wind—they were “spontaneous creatures.”239 The Anishinaabeg
are the manifestation of the full circle of creation, destruction, and recreation.
The very existence of an Anishinaabe binoojiinh/penojé is the
continuing manifestation of this cycle of re-creation. As Leanne Simpson
concludes, “Nishnaabeg parenting was rooted in attachment, following
children through their stages of development, with empathy, patience,
unconditional love, mutual respect, and freedom of choice.”240 Children
are not chattel. Children are people with agency, to whom we are all
obligated. And because children are effectively agents of change, they
are the greatest threats to those who now possess power. It is obvious
why colonizers and oppressors target children.241
Congress has power to enact ICWA, to preempt inconstant state
laws, and require that state courts apply it. Even if some provisions of
ICWA violated that Anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth
Amendment, Congress has potent power under Section 5 to enact those
provisions and to force state actors to comply with it.
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